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This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition pol-
icy system, which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of 
institutions. In doing so, it targets to contribute bridging a gap in the current 
world economic order, i.e. the lack of supranational governance of private in-
ternational restrictions to market competition. Such governance can effectively 
be designed against the background of a combination of the well-known non-
discrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, compe-
tition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment 
of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while 
the substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing na-
tional and regional antitrust regimes.  
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1.  International Competition Policy as a Multilevel  
System 
The problem of the appropriate design of the world economic order and suffi-
cient global governance has been brought up on the agenda again in a dramatic 
way by the recent financial crisis. One of the issues in the focus of global eco-
nomic policy – though perhaps not at the heart of the financial crisis
1 – is the 
emergence of competitive markets that are easily larger in geographic extent 
than jurisdictional borders. Along with the benefits of breaking up sclerotic 
structures on national markets and intensifying efficiency-enhancing and inno-
vation-driving competition forces comes the problem how to deal with the anti-
competitive, welfare-reducing implications of global business behaviour. It is 
well-known that competition exerts incentives on firms to improve their per-
formance in order to be successful (competition on the merits) – and it does so 
better than any other known coordination mechanism. However, ‘striving to 
perform better’ is not the only way for firms to be successful in competition. 
Alternatively, they can turn the incentives into restricting competition (anti-
competitive behaviour), like joining cartels, merging towards dominating posi-
tions or even monopolies, and playing predatory strategies in order to oust and 
deter competitors. This, it is a widespread insight that competition needs to be 
protected both against governmental and private restrictions (Budzinski 2008b). 
Those private restrictions of competition are traditionally dealt with by compe-
tition rules and the enforcement activities of competition (or antitrust) authori-
ties. 
 
While the current world economic order addresses governmental restrictions to 
international competition via the trade policy framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), private restrictions to international competition have re-
                                                            
1   Although it must be emphasised that the problem of an ostensibly unregulated competition among 
banks and on financial markets is part of the discussion.  
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mained an exclusive domain of nation states.
2 More than six decades after the 
vision of a comprehensive International Trade Organisation (ITO; the so-called 
Havana Charta) that was to cover both public and private restrictions to compe-
tition, the protection of international competition against restrictions by private 
enterprises is still done by jurisdictions and their agencies that often are much 
smaller in geographical terms than the markets in which the anticompetitive ac-
tions take place. Such a ‘system’ of uncoordinated national policies towards in-
ternational business practices was able to survive for such a long time partly 
because the application of the effects doctrine allowed for some degree of pro-
tection of national markets against international restrictions to competition. 
 
However, through the years of academic and political discussion about the ne-




•  In the face of an ongoing internationalisation of business activities along 
with a globalisation process of competition and markets, anticompetitive 
practices like cartels, predatory and exclusionary strategies, as well as 
monopolising (or otherwise anticompetitive) mergers have also interna-
tionalised. As a consequence, global welfare cannot be maximised with-
out an internationally coordinated competition policy.
4 The reliance on 
national competition policy regimes does not suffice anymore due to 
regulatory gaps, for instance, negative externalities from strategic compe-
tition policies, effects on markets in smaller and developing countries, 
business and administration costs of multiple parallel antitrust proceed-
                                                            
2   Or, in some exceptional instances, the domain of confederations of nation states (like the European 
Union). 
3   This elaborate discussion cannot be reported here in detail, see instead Budzinski (2008a: 10-150) and 
the literature quoted therein. 
4   See Barros/Cabral (1994); Head/Ries (1997); Kaiser/Vosgerau (2000); Tay/Willmann (2005); Hau-
cap/Müller/Wey (2006).  
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ings, and jurisdictional conflicts over antitrust cases.
5 Thus, on one hand, 
some sort of an international competition policy regime is necessary. 
 
•  On the other hand, the hitherto existing efforts to establish global compe-
tition rules and respective enforcement institutions have failed. Along 
with politico-economic reasons, the resistance to create and implement a 
powerful global antitrust authority are supported by economic insights, 
for instance, information asymmetries (closeness of the regulators to the 
regulated markets and industries), diverging competition policy prefer-




Therefore, neither a purely decentralised solution (national competition re-
gimes), nor a strongly centralised solution (domination of global rules and au-
thorities) seems feasible. Instead, the creation of supranational competition pol-
icy competences must realistically build upon and complement the further on 
existing national and supranational (e.g. common European Union competition 
policy) regimes. As a consequence, both the academic discourse and the policy 
practice have increasingly focused on intermediate solutions, encompassing 
elements of decentralised and centralised solutions. In particular, concepts of 
network governance have gained increasing popularity within various disci-
plines, e.g. political, legal, and social sciences as well as in economics. Regard-
ing international competition policy, Tarullo (2000) develops a regulatory-
convergence approach, in which systematic network cooperation provides “a 
mechanism for structuring and monitoring the mutual expectations of states” (p. 
495) in order to make national regulations more congruent across interacting ju-
risdictions. He vehemently argues in favour of a participation of the existing an-
titrust agencies in the process of generating an international regime. In a com-
                                                            
5   See e.g. Jacquemin (1995); Fox (2000); Klodt (2001); ICN (2002); Budzinski (2003a: 4-10); Jenny 
(2003a, 2003b).  
6   See  e.g.  Hauser/Schoene (1994); Smets/Van Cayseele (1995); Budzinski (2003a: 11-18); Ep-
stein/Greve (2004); McGinnis (2004); Stephan (2004).  
10 
patible approach, Maher (2002) views competition policy networks to be an 
important regime-building factor and, in this sense, “a prerequisite to any 
greater internationalisation” (p. 114). Consequently, the emphasis is predomi-
nantly on the way towards international competition governance and to a lesser 
extent on the sustainable design of the regime. First (2003) also focuses on 
identifying superior avenues towards an international competition policy re-
gime. He develops an interesting and challenging concept of mapping the exist-
ing antitrust networks. In doing so, he emphasises the fact that a number of ex-
isting antitrust regimes must be characterised as complex institutional arrange-
ments (‘networks’) themselves. Against the background of the U.S. experience 




Actually, the policy sphere has embraced network governance with the intro-
duction of the International Competition Network (ICN), which – despite being 
rather informal – represents the currently most viable avenue towards interna-
tional competition policy coordination after the efforts to introduce competition 
rules in the WTO Doha round have eventually failed (Bode/Budzinski 2006). 
However, the ICN is a forum for purely voluntary cooperation only and, while 
providing valuable work in terms of building a common spirit of competition 
among the members, falls short of an effective governance of international 
competition (Budzinski 2004). 
 
If international competition policy competences are introduced in addition to 
the prevailing national and regional-supranational regimes, then a multilevel 
system of competition policy competences (Budzinski 2003a: 39-52; Kerber 
2003) comes into existence. Reconstructing the problem of a coordinated inter-
national system of competition policies in terms of a multilevel system can 
serve as a framework for analysing intermediate institutional arrangements, 
combining coherence and diversity or balancing centralising with decentralising 
                                                            
7   “My overall view is that for a system of antitrust enforcement to remain dynamic, overcentralization 
must be avoided and some degree of chaos tolerated” First (2003: 24).  
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elements and forces. Within such a multilevel system, the allocation and delimi-
tation of competences represents a crucial issue. This paper attempts to utilize 
the framework of multilevel systems in order to develop a proposal for an inter-
national competition policy system that can improve the current world eco-
nomic order by mitigating the problems of cross-border private restrictions to 
competition. This proposal somewhat represents the least centralised design that 
can be expected to provide an effective protection of international competition. 
2.  Fundamentals of an International Multilevel System 
of Competition Policies 
The concept of multilevel systems represents an analytical framework to de-
scribe and model complex regimes, which include of a multitude of interrelated 
institutions and organisations. Generally speaking, a system consists of ele-
ments and interrelations (or, synonymously, interconnections). If the (interre-
lated) elements are located on more than one level, a multilevel system is con-
stituted. Within such a system, interrelations occur regarding two dimensions: 
vertical interrelations between elements on different levels and horizontal inter-
relations between elements of one and the same level. Theoretically, also di-
agonal interrelations between non-vertically interrelated elements of different 
levels are possible. If they occur comprehensively, a true network results. Thus, 
networks qualify as an extreme variant of a multilevel system.  
 
Though it does not represent a necessary condition, multilevel systems, more 
often than not, possess only one element on the top level and an increasing 
number of elements on downward levels.
8 In respect to complex international 
competition policy regimes, possible levels include global, regional-
supranational, national, and local. The elements include competition policy au-
                                                            
8   The characterisations ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ do not imply assessments of importance or superior-
ity versus inferiority. In particular, no prejudice about the competence (neither in a positive nor in a 
normative sense) of a level to exert jurisdiction over an antitrust case is implied. In the context of this 
paper, top-down only means from centralised to decentralised, e.g. from global to local.   
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thorities (antitrust agencies, competent ministries, courts, etc.) and antitrust in-
stitutions (substantive rules, procedural rules, assessment techniques, enforce-
ment practices, etc.). In order to constitute a system, however, these elements 
have to be interrelated. These interrelations are represented by the allocation 
and delimitation of competition policy competences. 
 
Drawing on the current structure of antitrust in the world and in the leading ju-
risdictions, the following vertical structure of an international multilevel system 
of competition policies is assumed. The top level is global, thus paying tribute 
to the process of market globalisation. The second level, however, can also be 
supranational when it consists of competition policy regimes that are interna-
tional, albeit regionally limited. A natural example – and the most comprehen-
sively developed one – is the competition policy of the EU. However, there is a 
distinct number of additional free trade areas and economic integration projects, 
which either entail competition policy provisions or are likely to develop some 
in the future. However, the second level is currently dominated by nationwide 
competition policy regimes, like the federal antitrust policy of the U.S., Japan, 
or Germany. Eventually, a third level refers to subnational (local) competition 
policy regimes, like the antitrust policy efforts of the U.S. states or the State 
Cartel Offices in Germany. The delimitation of ‘subnational’, ‘national’, and 
‘supranational’ follows the historically-originated current structure of nations, 
their associations and confederations, and their internal institutional designs. As 
a consequence, competition policy regimes with significantly differing extent, 
power, or meaning can be located at the same level. However, every alternative 
vertical structure of levels would be subject to the disadvantage of being illu-
sory. 
 
Competence allocation plays an important role in regard to the performance of 
the system as a whole. It is sensitive for the sustainable integration of coherence 
and diversity in order to create a complex but coherent international competi-
tion policy regime. The concept of multilevel systems allows for a systematic, 
theory-based analysis of such regimes. Complexity and diversity are explicitly  
13 
modelled by the existence of more than one level of jurisdiction and the possi-
bility of having more than one institution/agency at each level (variety of ele-
ments). Coherence is represented in the system by the vertical and horizontal 
interrelations between the elements, i.e. by the design of the interfaces. In other 
words, the allocation and delimitation of competences decides whether coher-
ence within the system can be achieved without eroding the multilevel charac-
ter. Thus, the choice of the rules, which determine competence allocation and 
delimitation, represent a decisive problem in regard to the workability of a mul-
tilevel system. 
 
In the framework of multilevel systems, the problem of competence allocation 
and delimitation possesses a number of dimensions: 
 
•  Vertical and horizontal allocation of competences (dimension DI): compe-
tences are allocated vertically between the levels (which is the competent 
level?) and horizontally among the authorities and institutions of the same 
level (which is the competent institution/authority on a specific level?). 
Additionally, problems of diagonal delimitation can occur in the case of 
allocative effects between a jurisdiction on a downward level and a juris-




•  Institutional competences (DII): competition policy regimes can consist of 
a number of institutional competences. The competence to create, imple-
ment and shape competition rules (DIIa) can be differently allocated than 
the competence to apply antitrust rules (DIIb) or the competence to enforce 
the applied rules (DIIc). Moreover, substantive rules and procedural rules 
can be distinguished and allocated in a different way. Regarding any spe-
cific antitrust case, it must be decided, which set of competition rules is 
                                                            
9   Imagine, e.g., the question of competence allocation between the EU (supranational but regionally 
limited level) and Canada (national level but not within the regional scope of the EU).  
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applied and which agency is responsible. For instance, a downward level 
agency can be competent in enforcing the rules of an upward level 
agency. Or, an upward level agency only consists of procedural rules to 
enforce downward level substantive rules. Similarly, on one and the same 
level agency A (set of rules Φ) can be competent in moulding substantive 
rules, whereas agency B (set of rules Ω) is responsible to apply them (e.g. 
domestic rules might be applied by a foreign agency). Consequently, the 
competence allocation regarding rule-making can differ from the one re-
garding rule-application and enforcement. 
  
 
•  Exclusive and concurrent allocation of competences (DIII): the compe-
tence to exert jurisdiction over a specific antitrust case can be exclusively 
allocated to one institution and one agency. For instance, a specific case 
may fall exclusively under the European competition rules and jurisdic-
tion is exclusively allocated to the European Commission. If competence 
allocation and delimitation is ambiguous, concurrent jurisdiction emerges. 
For instance, the German Cartel Office might want to challenge a cartel, 
applying European competition rules. At the same time, the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission pursues the same cartel under federal U.S. laws. 
 
•  Sustainable and temporary competence allocation (DIV): balancing cen-
tralising and decentralising forces within the system is a dynamic prob-
lem. Multilevel systems evolve along with competence allocation and de-
limitation. This can lead to two kinds of deficiencies: (i) a creeping proc-
ess of centralisation, incrementally eroding the benefits of having decen-
tralised elements, and (ii) a creeping process of decay, incrementally 
eroding the benefits of having centralised elements. Therefore, the alloca-
tion and delimitation of competences must not only focus on stationary 
combination of advantages of centralism and decentralism. It must also 
secure the sustainability of the system by controlling and balancing the 
centralising and decentralising forces. However, this need not imply that  
15 
the once-implemented allocation and delimitation of competences must 
not be changed. 
 
 









 D IIa   rule-making 
 D IIb   rule-application 








sustainable vs. temporary 
 
Eventually, the principle structure of competition policy regimes matters in 
terms of centralism and decentralism. Basic regime types include the court sys-
tem, the administration system, and the private litigation system.  
 
•  In the court system, final decisions are made by competition courts. A 
government attorney or a competent public agency files law suits against 
anticompetitive business arrangements and practices and is forced to 
prove its allegations. With respect to the U.S. antitrust system, it is argued 
that the court system offers superior capabilities in terms of flexibility and 
innovation (e.g. Kovacic 1992, 2004). The reason is that plaintiffs have 
incentives to offer contrary evidence and theories against the government 
advocates with the judge weighing the different positions and, maybe, 
calling for additional and independent expertise.
10 
                                                            
10  However, the regime is asymmetric. If the government authorities decide not to challenge an ar-
rangement or practice – on whatever grounds – no court supervision occurs.  
16 
•  In an administration system, the competent competition authority both in-
vestigates and decides about anticompetitive business arrangements and 
practices. Courts become involved only if the respective enterprises file 
an appeal against the administrative decision. In such a scenario, it be-
comes important to distinguish between a government authority (like the 
European Commission) and agency independence.
11 The former is likely 
to experience difficulty withstanding distortionary influences from non-
antitrust policy areas (and lobbyism), whereas the latter can focus exclu-
sively on competition matters. Intraregime diversity may be more limited 
in administration systems due to the strong position of the competent 
agency.  
 
•  In the system of private litigation, no public authority apart of ‘ordinary’ 
courts is involved. The private parties themselves enforce competition 
law through law suits filed by the injured party of an anticompetitive ar-
rangement or practice (e.g. vertically related parties like consumers, resel-
lers, component suppliers, etc., or horizontally related parties like compet-
itors). Although this obviously entails a number of problems if the overall 
regime is based on private litigation, elements of private litigation are in-
cluded in many antitrust regimes. Private litigation plays an important 
role within the U.S. antitrust system and its meaning in the EU is increas-
ing. Additionally, it has some regional importance in the enforcement of 
rules against unfair competition (e.g. delusive and untrue advertising, de-
famatory actions against competitors, incorrect price marking, etc.). 
 
These basic regime types rarely occur in their pure variant in real-world anti-
trust regimes. Instead, real-world regimes usually represent specific mixtures of 
the described basic elements. 
 
                                                            
11  A comprehensive example represents the European Central Bank. Within the antitrust world, the 
Federal Cartel Office of Germany possesses somewhat limited independence.  
17 
In summary, an international multilevel system of competition policies consists 
of  
 
•  a multitude of competition rules, among many others global competition 
provisions, the EU competition rules, U.S. statutes like the Sherman Act, 
the German Act against Restraints of Competition, Californian antitrust 
provisions, etc. 
 
•  a multitude of antitrust authorities, among many others the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau, State Cartel Of-
fices in Germany, the European Commission, some global instance, etc. 
 
•  a multitude of differently designed regimes across the levels, including 
court systems, government administration systems, independent admini-
stration systems, elements of private litigation, and all kinds of mixed 
types. 
3.  A Proposal for an International Multilevel Competi-
tion Policy System 
3.1.  The Problem of Competence Allocation and Delimitation 
The workability of such a complex international multilevel system of competi-
tion policies demands intelligently-designed competence allocation and delimi-
tation rules. Such rules can have very different designs, corresponding to differ-
ing performances. Budzinski (2008a: 151-217) identifies nine stylised compe-
tence allocation rules. Due to restrictions in space and the focus of this paper, 
this analysis cannot be mirrored here in detail. Instead, this paper draws on re-
spective comparative analyses that highlight in particular two types of competi-
tion rules - the nondiscrimination rule and the mandatory lead jurisdiction  
18 
model - and employs these principles as the backbone of an international multi-
level competition policy system. 
The Nondiscrimination Rule 
The principle of nondiscrimination belongs to the most important and funda-
mental principles of the GATT-WTO-framework for international trade. Re-
garding international antitrust, Trebilcock and Iacobucci (2004) developed an 
extended and modified nondiscrimination rule that incorporates the following 
elements. Competition policy regimes are not allowed to discriminate between 
domestic and foreign producers and consumers.
12 In particular, they must not 
favour domestic consumers and/or producers at the expense of foreign ones or 
disadvantage foreign consumers and/or producers compared to domestic ones. 
This includes the design of the national and regional competition rules itself as 
well as the way they are enforced. Both a supervision (or complaint) and a 
sanction mechanism to identify and stop discriminating antitrust policies com-
plement the antitrust nondiscrimination principle.  
 
What does this imply for the dimensions of competence allocation identified in 
section 2? With respect to DI (jurisdictional scope of competences), the nondis-
crimination rule limits the competence to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
the legitimate interest of the foreign jurisdictions to design their domestic laws 
according to their own preferences (as long as they are non-discriminatory). 
Horizontally, this means that extraterritorial jurisdiction must not interfere with 
domestic policies as long as they treat domestic and foreign producers and con-
sumers in the same way (implying a priority of intrajurisdictional competition 
policy as long as the nondiscrimination principle is not violated). Vertically, an 
upward allocation of competences to a supranational level is implied in regard 
to (alleged) discriminations and anticompetitive arrangements or practices that 
generate conflicting competition policies on the downward level.  
                                                            
12  The inclusion of consumers represents an important extension of the trade-oriented variant of the 
nondiscrimination concept.  
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The institutional competences (DII) of each jurisdiction are limited to institu-
tional arrangements that are non-discriminatory. This excludes a number of 
popular rule designs, e.g. the exemption of pure export cartels from the general 
prohibition of cartels and surrogates. Notwithstanding this, rule-making compe-
tences (DIIa) remain exclusively on the downward (national and local) levels – 
the supranational level gains no competence to create, design, and implement 
its own substantive competition rules. In cases of discrimination and conflict, 
the upward level gains application and enforcement competences, however, in a 
limited and indirect way. Only conflict resolution competences are assigned to 
the upward level, irrespective of whether they follow complaints by downward 
jurisdictions or result from supervision. This can mean competences to decide, 
which rules of which downward jurisdictions apply to a specific anticompetitive 
arrangement or practice (DIIb). It can also cover decisions about enforcement 
competences (DIIc). However, the upward level neither directly applies down-
ward institutions, nor directly enforces them. An indirect rule-making compe-
tence might occur because the upward level decides whether complained-about 
competition rules or antitrust practices of downward jurisdictions violate the 
nondiscrimination principle or not – which can be a controversial matter. This 
indirect competence remains very limited, though, since the upward level can 
only negatively condemn specific provisions but it cannot prescribe specifi-
cally-designed rules.  
 
With respect to DIII, unchallenged exclusive competence only occurs in regard 
to purely domestic business arrangements without participation of foreign pro-
ducers and without effects on foreign consumers. Otherwise, discrimination 
claims and inbound effects from the perspective of other jurisdictions might 
generate concurrent competences. On the supranational level, exclusive conflict 
resolution competences exist. The sustainability of competence allocation (DIV) 
is subject to two countervailing forces. On the one hand, the number of dis-
criminatory provisions and practices in the national and regional competition 
policy regimes should cease in the course of time because of the complaint, su-
pervision, and sanction mechanism. On the other hand, an ongoing globalisa- 
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tion of business activities might lead to an increasing number of interjurisdic-
tional antitrust conflicts about the (non-) discriminatory character of institutions 
and decisions. 
The Mandatory Lead Jurisdiction Model 
The basic principle of the mandatory lead jurisdiction model is that if an anti-
competitive arrangement or practice is to be reviewed by more than one compe-
tition policy regime (according to their respective standards), a lead jurisdiction 
reviews and decides the case vicariously for the other ones (Camp-
bell/Trebilcock 1997). An international panel decides about the appointment of 
a competent and appropriate lead jurisdiction in regard to a specific anticom-
petitive arrangement or practice.
13 So, the competence to deal with this case is 
allocated to the internationally chosen lead jurisdiction (both regarding author-
ity and institution), which is obliged to pay attention to anticompetitive effects 
in other jurisdictions and entitled to call on other antitrust regimes for assis-
tance.  
 
What does this imply for the dimensions of competence allocation identified in 
section 2? Firstly, the jurisdictional scope of competition policy competences 
(DI) is horizontally affected since the appointed lead jurisdiction becomes com-
petent for the overall case while other affected jurisdictions eventually loose 
competence to deal with the case autonomously.
14 The vertical allocation of 
competences, in contrast, is not involved in a substantive sense. However, a 
new type of competence, the appointment competence (selecting the lead juris-
diction), is created at the top level. 
 
With respect to the institutional competences (DII), the rule-making compe-
tences (DIIa) of the national and local regimes are left untouched because the 
                                                            
13   This represents a modified version of the suggestion by Campbell/Trebilcock (1997: 110-112). 
14   Note that they remain involved in the course of their consultation and cooperation with the appointed 
lead jurisdiction.  
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supranational level does not acquire any substantive rule-making competence. 
As each jurisdiction theoretically qualifies to be the lead jurisdiction for some 
cases, no restriction to the regime sovereignty in terms of rule-making occurs. 
However, the enforcement competences for a given case are allocated to the re-
spective lead jurisdiction (DIIc). Although an appointed lead jurisdiction applies 
its own antitrust institutions, the decision concerning which competition rules 
are applied to a specific anticompetitive arrangement or practice is effectively 
allocated to the supranational level (DIIb) because it is competent to select and 
appoint the lead jurisdiction. Consequently, the mandatory lead jurisdiction 
model leads to an exclusive allocation of competences (DIII). After the suprana-
tional level has exerted its exclusive competence to appoint the lead jurisdic-
tion, the latter has exclusive competence to deal with the respective case.  
Combining the Principles 
These two competence allocation principles complement each other with regard 
to the problems of international competition policy outlined in section 1. The 
lead jurisdiction model heals the problems from multijurisdictional reviews and 
proceedings by providing a coherent review of any case through the coordinat-
ing hands of the appointed lead jurisdiction. Furthermore, it tends to alleviate 
information asymmetries if the lead jurisdiction is chosen so that it is compara-
tively close to the markets in which the anticompetitive conduct or agreements 
take place. However, the lead jurisdiction model alone would not provide suffi-
cient protection against strategic or otherwise biased competition policies. This 
is where the nondiscrimination rule steps in by ensuring the respectfulness for 
outbound effects as well as for diverging preferences across countries. In addi-
tion, the interplay of both principles entails potentials for diminishing jurisdic-




                                                            
15   See for an elaborate theoretical analysis Budzinski (2008a: 156-160, 178-217).  
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A regime built upon the combination of the nondiscrimination rule and the 
mandatory lead jurisdiction model does not require that the top level prescribes 
concrete substantive provisions against cartels or abusive and predatory modes 
of enterprise behaviour or consists of a distinctive merger control. Instead, the 
upward allocation of competences can be limited to the selection of competent 
jurisdictions as well as complaint and supervision competences. The latter be-
comes especially important since it answers the question how a sanction 
mechanism might look like that promotes compliance with the outlined princi-
ples. The next section presents a proposal of how adequate competence alloca-
tion rules for a coherent and federalist governance of global competition that 
are built upon the principles nondiscrimination and lead jurisdiction could look 
like in a concrete way.  
3.2.  The Global Level: Allocating Competences and Providing Super-
vision and Monitoring 
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that a real ‘global level’ repre-
sents a precondition for a sound governance of worldwide competition. How-
ever, the differentiated analysis of the multilevel approach allows for and re-
quires a closer look on the competences that a global level inalienably needs in 
order to cope with its tasks. A combination of the two outlined competence al-
location rules implies that an international competition policy regime does not 
require substantive antitrust laws at the global level.  
 
Nevertheless, the global level should be equipped with considerable compe-
tences, namely (i) selection of competent jurisdictions (which incompletely 
represents a rule-application competence) according to the mandatory lead ju-
risdiction model and (ii) combat discriminatory rules and practices on other 
levels according to the nondiscrimination principle. The latter may be called a 
limited rule-making competence – limited to the ban of discriminatory antitrust. 
However, there is a difference that is important from an institutional-economic 
perspective. The global level is only entitled to prohibit discriminatory rules  
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and practices. It cannot and must not prescribe how competition rules and anti-
trust practices on downward levels should look like. The most important aspect 
here is that (Hayek 1975; Kerber 1993; Wegner 1997)  
 
•  a prohibition excludes only one specific option from the non-determined 
set of possible options,
16 whereas 
 
•  a prescription effectively eliminates any scope of selection and de facto 
excludes all the other options by prescribing one of them. 
 
In the first case, the downward levels maintain behavioural freedom, including 
the freedom to create innovative solutions. Each is effectively eroded in the 
second case. 
 
Consequently, fundamental rule-making competences and the remaining scope 
of rule-application competences are not allocated to the top level. The same is 
true for direct enforcement competences. It is the lead jurisdiction, which ap-
plies their own or other competition rules to a given anticompetitive arrange-
ment or practice and enforces the outcome of its proceedings. However, refer-
ring to the externality issue as the weakest point of both favoured competence 
allocation rules, the lead jurisdiction is expected to produce positive external-
ities (i.e. protect competition also in regard to other jurisdictions’ markets and 
consumers), which generates an incentive problem. Therefore, supervision 
competences must be additionally allocated to the global level.
17 One might call 
this a kind of indirect enforcement competence, but, again, upward compe-
tences only cover the ability to abolish deficient decisions of the lead jurisdic-
                                                            
16   The set of possible options is ex ante always indetermined because of the creative abilities of human 
agents to create formerly unknown – because non-existent – modes of behaviour and institutional ar-
rangements (Wegner 1997; Budzinski 2003b). 
17   For instance, the general necessity of an external monitoring of activities of downward level jurisdic-
tions in an otherwise federal or decentralised regime is also emphasised by Figueiredo/Weingast 
(2005).  
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tion regarding nondiscrimination and comity. The global level authorities’ are 
not competent to apply and enforce (whichever) competition law themselves. 
 
In order to handle the outlined competences, which are specified below, an 
agency is needed at the global level. Allow me to call it the International Com-
petition Panel (ICP).
18 According to the combination of the mandatory lead ju-
risdiction model and the nondiscrimination rule, its competences can be speci-
fied to include the following three elements. 
 
- Selection of Lead Jurisdiction 
The ICP appoints a lead jurisdiction, preferably from the second level. As a 
lead jurisdiction for a given anticompetitive arrangement or practice quali-
fies (i) regional gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enter-
prises, (ii) the absence of discriminatory provisions in the potentially compe-
tent competition policy regime, and (iii) willingness and experience of the 
potentially competent antitrust authorities to employ a world welfare stan-
dard, i.e. to safeguard comity to other jurisdictions’ markets and consumers. 
The lead jurisdiction receives full competences to deal with the respective 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice under the obligation of nondiscrimi-
nation and pursuance of the common welfare of all affected consumers irre-
spective of their location. 
 
- Supervision and Sanctions 
The ICP reviews the competition rules and codified practices of the down-
ward levels’ antitrust regimes regarding violations of the nondiscrimination 
principle. In cases of discriminatory rules or practices, it demands the modi-
fication of the respective provisions (however, without prescribing alterna-
tive designs).
19 If the respective competition policy regime refuses to adjust 
                                                            
18   My intention is not focused on names. Any other denomination of this agency would also be fine as 
long as it is equipped with the described competences. 
19   It remains within the competencies of the decentralised competition policy regimes to develop an in-
stitutional solution, which heals the discrimination problem.  
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its rules and practices according to the requirements of the nondiscrimination 
principle, this regime is disqualified and suspended as lead jurisdiction. This 
procedure also applies safeguarding a minimum necessary nexus of down-
ward competition policy regimes with an anticompetitive arrangement or 
practice to claim jurisdiction.
20 Additionally, the ICP supervises the review 
and decision process by the lead jurisdiction, but exclusively concerning vio-
lations of nondiscrimination. Potential sanctions are similar to the general 
nondiscrimination review procedure. 
 
- Complaints and Conflict Resolution 
The ICP hears and reviews complaints from jurisdictions or enterprises (i) 
about decisions of the lead jurisdiction, which disregard foreign consumers 
and/or nondiscrimination, and (ii) about discriminatory rules or practices of 
downward level competition policy regimes (including insufficient nexus). 
Any complaints by parties to the case about wrong assessments by the com-
petent antitrust authority or dissents regarding the facts of a case fall under 
the competency of the courts and appellation bodies of the lead jurisdiction. 
In this sense, ICP provides a forum to deal with conflicts between downward 
level jurisdictions. 
 
While the ICP represents the final instance regarding its supervision and con-
flict resolution tasks, an appellation body regarding its jurisdictional decisions 
(i.e. appointment of the appropriate lead jurisdiction) is needed. An interna-
tional court could be one suitable solution, a second chamber of the panel an-
other. The latter may be preferable in order to keep the selection procedure 
compact. Otherwise, transaction costs and the administrative burden on busi-
ness would increase, deteriorating institutional efficiency. 
 
                                                            
20   Claiming jurisdiction without a sufficient nexus to the respective arrangement can be interpreted as 
representing an indirect kind of discrimination. It is necessary to include the nexus issue in the super-
vision and sanction mechanism with respect to competition policy competences on national and sub-
national-regional levels.   
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Anticompetitive arrangements and practices with more than negligible cross-
jurisdictional effects concerning the downward levels fall under the described 
competences of the ICP. Regarding mergers and other interfirm alliances the 
following procedure could prove to be compact and efficient. According to the 
self-assessment of the participating enterprises, these arrangements are pre-
notified to the ICP.
21 A standardised notification procedure could minimise fil-
ing efforts while providing the necessary information to decide about the ap-
propriate lead jurisdiction. If arrangements with considerable cross-border ef-
fects are only notified to a downward level jurisdiction, then the receiving 
agency must delegate the notification to the ICP.
22 Concerning illegal cartels, 
which are usually performed secretly, and abusive behaviour, a notification to 
the ICP occurs according to the assessment of the downward level antitrust au-
thorities, who discover them. In such cases, the ICP’s appointment of a lead ju-
risdiction must sometimes rely on provisional knowledge and hypotheses about 
the nature of the cartel or abuse. However, since – according to experience in 
anticartel interagency cooperation – overall cooperation between the affected 
regimes works considerably well in such cases due to similar interests, the ap-
pointment of the second- or third-best appropriate jurisdiction does not repre-
sent a serious problem.
23 
 
                                                            
21   The self-assessment by the enterprises should not entail dangers of forum shopping because when as-
sessing the cross-border effects, the respective enterprises are not choosing between different compe-
tition laws (since this decision is made by the ICP). Moreover, an ICP pre-notification of an anticom-
petitive arrangement or practice without considerable cross-border effects does not generate signifi-
cant harm because the competence to substantially deal with the arrangement is allocated downwards 
anyhow. If only one downward level jurisdiction is really affected, the selection of a ‘lead’ jurisdic-
tion is rather simple and indisputable. 
22   Such cases are likely to occur only infrequently. If an arrangement affects more than one decentral-
ised competition policy regime, the participating agencies are required to notify to more than one 
agency – and, at the same time, they experience the incentive to make use of the one-stop shop via an 
ICP pre-notification. 
23   In cases of cartel participants ’voluntarily’ confessing due to the incentives set by leniency programs, 
the procedure mirrors that of merger notifications. If someone confesses to the ’wrong’, this agency 
must redirect her to the appropriate level/authority.   
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This leads towards the organisational design of the ICP. Actually, there are dif-
ferent ways to organise an agency with the above sketched competences. One 
obvious alternative would be to integrate the ICP within the WTO framework. 
This would complete the WTO as the primary organisation, which is responsi-
ble for the governance of global markets. With both public and private re-
straints of competition falling under the competence of the WTO, global com-
petition would then be subject to coherent governance out of one single hand. 
The late completion of the postwar ITO vision clearly comes with considerable 
sympathy. However, it can be useful to sacrifice this ideal paragon in favour of 
a more practicable or consensuable solution. The major problem with a WTO 
competition policy is the significant difference between the prevailing mecha-
nisms of international trade policy and the demands of a decentralised interna-
tional competition policy system. It represents an important practical difference 
whether one deals with state action restricting trade or with private business be-
haviour, which might produce anticompetitive effects – with respect to time-
frames, parties’ rights, economic analysis, etc. On the other hand, in the frame-
work of an ICP, which is suggested here, the international authority only deals 
with public agencies – namely competition agencies – and their claims of juris-
diction and handling of assigned competences. Moreover, there are consider-
able overlaps, for instance, regarding discriminatory competition policy strate-
gies (like selective non-enforcement of competition rules, promotion of out-
bound restrictions, etc.). Nevertheless, significant differences between the pro-
posal in this paper and the current WTO architecture are obvious and they 
might prove difficult to overcome. 
 
Alternatively, the ICP could constitute a separate independent international 
agency. Such an agency must be designed to (i) represent adequately the 
downward level jurisdictions and (ii) keep procedures compact and efficient. 
The first requirement facilitates the constitution and implementation of the ICP. 
In order to avoid an international political bargaining game, the competition au-
thorities of the existing national and supranational jurisdictions could serve as 
natural constituents and members of the ICP. To some extent, one of the consti- 
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tuting principles of the ICN serves as a paragon – namely aiming for a coordi-
nation among competition authorities instead of among governments. Further-
more, an obvious advantage of this strategy would be the possibility to develop 
the ICP out of the popular ICN – albeit, it would more likely entail the charac-
teristics of a replacement. 
 
Another organisational paragon for an international panel consisting of experts 
is represented by the European System of Central Banks or, more precisely, its 
major decision forum, the Governing Council (European Central Bank 2004). 
Drawing on this, the ICP Governing Chamber could consist of a board of ap-
pointed ICP directors and the presidents, governors, etc. of downward level an-
titrust authorities. However, in view of the second demand – compact and effi-
cient procedures – the number of members of Governing Chamber must not be 
excessive. Therefore, not every jurisdiction can be an acting member of the 
Governing Chamber at a given point of time. Along with, say, 5 directors, the 
chamber should consist of a maximum of 10 national or supranational-regional 
representatives. A rotation system must ensure that none of the participating ju-
risdiction is disadvantaged concerning its representation in the Governing 
Chamber. This rotation system could be designed to reflect the differing impor-
tance and meaning of the downward level jurisdictions in the world of antitrust. 
National or supranational-regional competition policy regimes with a large 
population and/or large economic weight should more often join the chamber 
than smaller ones. An indicator, which combines measures of population and 
economic activity, is not too difficult to develop. In fact, this mirrors the up-
coming rotation system regarding participation of national central bank gover-
nors in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, which became 
necessary in the face of the enlargement of the EU and enters into force if the 
new members qualify for and subsequently join the European Currency Unit 
(Baldwin 2001; Hefeker 2002). Roughly, the organisational side mirrors the in-
dependent administration system. 
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An additional precondition for compact and efficient procedures is the absence 
of veto rights or comprehensive consensus requirements. Instead of unanimity 
rules, a simple or qualified (e.g. two-thirds of the votes) majority should suffice 
to generate a definite decision. This is especially true if the independence of 
both the ICP and the members of its chambers is secured. The independence of 
the ICP board of directors is served if it consists of antitrust experts, which are 
appointed by the leaders of the downward level competition agencies. Since 
comprehensive independence of national and supranational-regional competi-
tion authorities may be unrealistic,
24 the design of the rotation system promotes 
the independence of the ICP if membership in the Governing Chamber is rather 
short (and, thus, rotation frequent) and overlapping (i.e. the chamber does not 
frequently consist of representatives of the same antitrust authorities because 
the individual periods are not parallel). 
 
If a second chamber (say Appellation Chamber) is employed in order to consti-
tute an appellation body regarding jurisdictional decisions of the Governing 
Chamber (i.e. selection of the lead jurisdiction according to the defined crite-
ria), then an obvious choice would be to let it also consist of representatives of 
national and supranational-regional competition authorities (second and third 
level) in a rotating way. Of course, jurisdictions must not fill a seat in both 
chambers at the same period of time. Again, some majority rule that prevents 
effective veto rights would be helpful. 
 
The preceding description of how an ICP could be designed is only exemplary 
for a number of alternative variants. In the context of this study, its main ration-
ale is to demonstrate how a concrete operationalisation of a global level author-
ity with the competences allocated and delimitated by the combination of man-
datory lead jurisdiction model and nondiscrimination rule could look like. 
Therefore (and different from the competence allocation rules), the organisa-
tional questions are only sketched and not subject to a rigorous analysis. 
                                                            
24   However, two decades ago the comprehensive independence of Central Banks in each EU member 
state would also have been deemed to be unrealistic.  
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3.3.  Supranational-Regional and National Competition Policy Regimes: 
Where Cases Are Decided 
The second level represents the first one, which disposes of substantive antitrust 
competences. It consists of (i) joint competition policy regimes of confedera-
tions or associations of independent countries as well as of (ii) national compe-
tition policy regimes.  
 
Looking at the first type, competition policy competences become allocated to a 
supranational level, albeit with limited regional scope. The most natural and 
comprehensive example is represented by the EU Competition Policy System, 
which contains full-fledged competition rules and an experienced antitrust prac-
tice. Additionally, there are antitrust provisions and agencies on a supranational 
level in the context of several other multicountry associations. For instance, 
both the Andean Community and the UEMOA (Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine) have implemented their own competition policy 
agencies, theoretically competent in enforcing specifically shaped community 
competition rules. Practically, however, both regimes are currently rather inac-
tive. Comparatively elaborate competition policy competences are located at the 
EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Surveillance Authority, whereas free 
trade and economic integration associations, like NAFTA (North American 
Free Trade Agreement), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
Mercosur (Mercado Común del Conor Sur), CIS (Community of Independent 
[former soviet] States), CARICOM (Carribean Community and Common Mar-
ket), FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas), SADC (South African Devel-
opment Community), or CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), cur-
rently only possess at best rudimental antitrust provisions. Meanwhile, CO-
MESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is also reaching for 
implementing considerable supranational competition policy competences. 
 
Following the paragon of the EU, these associations and confederations might 
develop effective competition policy regimes with considerable competition  
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policy competences in the course of time. Developed ones represent natural 
candidates for lead jurisdiction appointments as they jurisdictionally include a 
number of national markets and address consumers of different countries. 
Therefore, they automatically internalise parts of the externalities arising from 
cross-border business activities.  
 
Since currently only one effective supranational-regional antitrust regime ex-
ists, the major level of substantive competition policy is likely to remain at the 
second type of regimes at this level, namely national regimes, for a considerable 
time. In particular, national competition policy regimes with large and impor-
tant internal markets are likely to be frequently appointed as lead jurisdictions. 
Above all, this refers to the U.S. Antitrust System. However, the competition 
policy regimes of countries like Canada, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Russia, China, 




Effective competition policy regimes at this level retain full rule-making, rule-
application, and enforcement competences for cross-border anticompetitive ar-
rangements and practices if the upward level appoints them to be lead jurisdic-
tion in the respective case. Each regime autonomously shapes its own substan-
tive competition rules, enforcement institutions, and agencies (including an in-
dividual composition of elements of the court system, government and inde-
pendent administration system, and private litigation) minus discriminatory 
provisions and practices, which are excluded by the nondiscrimination rule and 
sanctioned by the global level. Against the background of these non-
discriminatory institutions and practices, each regime is obliged to consider 
                                                            
25  Next to inhabiting the regional gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises, a 
qualification to become appointed lead jurisdiction requires the absence of discriminatory provisions 
and practices as well as the proven willingness and experience to employ a world welfare standard 
(see above). This implies that some of the above mentioned countries might face a long way to go un-
til they meet these criteria. Note, however, that the possibility to qualify as lead jurisdiction can entail 
important incentives to develop national competition policy regimes according to the modern interna-
tional standards.  
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competitive effects outside its territory according to the common welfare of all 
affected consumers. Apart from that, the appointed lead jurisdiction is free to 
handle the referred case. Of course, it can seek the cooperation with and assis-
tance by other – horizontally- or vertically-interrelated – antitrust regimes as far 
as it deems this to be necessary and/or helpful. 
 
If a vertically-interrelated local level exists, an X-minus rule could provide an 
efficient and simple competence allocation rule. Its content would be that any 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice, which is notified to or detected by a 
supranational-regional or national competition policy regime, must be allocated 
downwards if the effects of the respective arrangement or practice occur within 
X or less national antitrust regimes.
26 Next to confederations or associations of 
independent states, large countries with big internal markets particularly benefit 
from internal decentralisation and, thus, from the existence of local competition 
policy regimes. According to this reasoning, the maintenance of American anti-
trust federalism is principally beneficial as would be the creation of federalised 
competition policy structures in comparably-sized countries (e.g. Russia or 
China).  
 
If no vertically-interrelated downward (local) level exists, a competition policy 
regime needs adequate notification thresholds for mergers and interfirm coop-
erative arrangements in order to avoid that jurisdiction is claimed even if no 
sufficient nexus with the (anti-) competitive effects of a business arrangement 
or practice exists. Concerning per se prohibited cartels and abusive modes of 
behaviour, such thresholds are also necessary but naturally do not refer to noti-
fication. If a national antitrust regime detects such a cartel or mode of behaviour 
that does not meet the thresholds for a sufficient domestic nexus, it is obliged to 
notify a horizontally- or vertically-interrelated regime with a sufficient nexus 
(according to top level standards). 
                                                            
26   The same delimitation of competences could be applied if a vertical (and diagonal) interrelation be-
tween a supranational-regional and national regimes exists, like for instance in the EU (common EU 




3.4.  Is There Still Scope for Local Competition Policies? 
Local competition policy regimes usually do not qualify as lead jurisdictions for 
cross-border antitrust cases. Their domains are local anticompetitive arrange-
ments and practices because, in this respect, they can exploit their advantages of 
being very close to the locally-affected markets. In such cases, however, they 
play an important role within a sound multilevel competition policy system. As 
discussed in the preceding section, particularly large countries with considera-
bly segmented internal markets benefit from downward level competition pol-
icy competences. Despite ongoing market globalisation, regional and local 
markets are unlikely to be completely eroded. Therefore, the scope for subna-
tional competition policy regimes is a sustainable one. 
 
However, it must be secured that only anticompetitive arrangements and prac-
tices with purely local effects fall under the jurisdiction of the regimes at this 
decentralised level. Here, an imbalance of centralising and decentralising forces 
is more likely to tend towards overdecentralisation. Therefore, upward alloca-
tion should be based on a competence allocation rule, which effectively mini-
mises multiple proceedings at this level. According to the preceding economic 
analysis, an X-plus rule with the value of X close to ‘2’ represents an adequate 
institutional arrangement. Only if the subnational jurisdictions represent con-
siderable numbers of consumers (because a very large countries subdivided into 
comparatively large subunits), a larger X might be justified. 
 
Obviously, competition policy regimes at this local level represent the most 
downward ones, wherefore the issue of a sufficient nexus between (anti-) com-
petitive impact and the claiming of jurisdiction becomes rather sensitive. There-
fore, the competition policy regimes at this level must implement triggering 
thresholds constituting jurisdiction and notification duties of private parties, 
which do not violate the safeguards for adequate jurisdiction according to top 
level standards.  
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4.  Some Comparisons to Other Proposals 
Contrary to many other proposals and contrary to the meanwhile aborted WTO 
Doha declaration (Fox 2003), this proposal abstains from allocating substantive 
rule-making competences to the global level. This particularly includes the 
definition of mandatory minimum standards in regard to substantive cartel and 
merger policy. For instance, proposals somewhat related to the initial DIAC ini-
tiative
27 generally prescribe comparatively ambitious minimum standards at the 
global level to which national competition rules must be adjusted. Examples are 
the prohibition of horizontal hardcore cartels, rule-of-reason provisions for all 
other cartels and cartel surrogates, a full-fledged merger control including man-
datory regulation of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, and provisions 
regarding abusive and predatory business practices. Since this initiative signifi-
cantly framed the WTO discourse on competition matters, the content of the 
Doha declaration as well as other WTO related proposals show considerable 
similarities and argue along comparable lines (Scherer 1994; Dabbah 2003; 
Wilson 2003; Klodt 2005). Different from these proposals, my proposal assigns 
no rule-making (DIIa) and – at best – only indirect rule-application competences 
(DIIb) to the global level. However, regarding enforcement competences (DIIc), 
the WTO-related proposals usually also refer to national competition authori-
ties.
28 More in line with the proposal presented here, Wilson (2003) explicitly 
introduces jurisdictional competences at the global level, although he limits his 
proposal to merger control. According to his proposal, the main task of the so-
called WTO Competition Office is to facilitate the consensual and cooperative 
selection of a lead jurisdiction by the affected member jurisdictions (Wilson 
2003: 312). However, the binding decision of the lead jurisdiction must follow 
                                                            
27   The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) was presented by the so-called Munich Group in 1995 
as a full-fledged proposal for a comprehensive international competition order in the context of the 
WTO. See for the original proposal Fikentscher/Immenga (1995) as well as for applications inter alia 
Drexl (1999, 2003) and Podszun (2003: 247-312). 
28  Maybe with the exception of Scherer (1994), whose proposal contains considerable enforcement 
competences of his International Competition Policy Office (ICPO) in the long run.  
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ambitious supranational minimum standards, which are moulded as a copy of 
U.S. antitrust laws (Wilson 2003: 309, 314). 
 
In contrast to these proposals, the one presented in this paper entails the benefit 
of being less centralistic by abstaining from substantive provisions on the 
global level. Instead, it develops a system of multilevel governance that has the 
potential to heal the most serious problems of the non-existence of a coherent 
international governance of competition despite relying on a permanently de-
centralised system. Therefore, there is no underlying vision of ultimate har-
monisation towards a one-dimensional global competition bureaucracy. In con-
trast, virtually all of the aforementioned proposals at least entail a perspective 
of harmonisation at the end of the road, i.e. harmonised competition rules, prac-
tices, and policies are targeted in the long run (e.g. Scherer 1994; Dabbah 2003; 
Wilson 2003; Klodt 2005). Waiving the vision of ultimate harmonisation entails 
two benefits. Firstly, the amount of sovereignty that must be sacrificed as a 
price for international governance is reduced, albeit not to zero. Past attempts to 
implement an international competition order often stranded because of the lack 
of willingness to transfer substantive competition policy competences to a su-
pranational body. This hurdle still exists in my proposal but it is certainly lower 
than in the WTO-related (‘ultimate harmonisation’) proposals since no substan-
tive competences must be ceded.
29 Secondly, the advantages of decentralised 
governance are maintained, in particular less sclerotic bureaucracy, alleviation 
of information asymmetries, respect for diverging preferences about competi-
tion policy across countries, higher flexibility and improved openness for inno-
vation and adaptation to new circumstances (in detail: Budzinski 2008a: 64-83). 
The benefits of a decentralised system of competition policies are highlighted 
by proposals that focus more on cooperation among existing competition policy 
                                                            
29   Obviously, there is no guarantee that the hurdle does not remain at a prohibitive size and probably 
some will remain pessimistic about the realisability of the proposal. However, it is less ambitious than 
other proposals in this regard. Like in the past, significant steps forward in international governance 
probably need the right ‘window of opportunity’.  
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regimes and a re reluctant to create a global level of governance.
30 Concepts of 
network governance (inter alia Tarullo 2000; Maher 2002; First 2003) attempt 
to alleviate the shortcomings of purely bilateral or case-by-case cooperation by 
seeking for a systematic multilateral cooperation. More often than not, the vol-
untary character of cooperation is emphasized. The ICN represents the attempt 
to operationalise the network idea. Competition agencies from all around the 
world meet on a voluntary basis in order to agree upon best practice recom-
mendations (benchmarking process) that then are hoped to be voluntarily im-
plemented by the participating agencies (Budzinski 2004). 
 
In comparison to these approaches, the proposal presented in this paper entails 
the benefit that it provides a more effective governance of international compe-
tition. Due to the supervision and conflict resolution competences on the global 
level (including sanction mechanisms that set considerable compliance incen-
tives), loopholes resulting from the fragmented enforcement and strategic com-
petition policies as well as jurisdictional conflicts can be remedied more effec-
tively and to a larger extent as reliance on purely voluntary compliance could.
31 
Moreover, the costs of multiple proceeding for business and taxpayers become 
significantly reduced. On the downside, the more effective protection of inter-
national competition comes at the price of a higher hurdle for consensus about 
such a multilevel system as compared with purely voluntary coordination. 
Therefore, this proposal does not suggest abandoning voluntary cooperation fo-
rums in the absence of a more effective solution. However, it somewhat repre-
sents a possible next step forward and the mildest regime (in terms of compe-
tence transfer to a global level) that can effectively solve the problems of a 
missing international competition order. As outlined in section 1, the multilevel 
                                                            
30   Instead of truly highlighting the benefits, these proposals sometimes are rather motivated by the ex-
pectation that nothing more than cooperation can be realised. 
31   Case-by-case (bilateral) cooperation is unlikely to remedy these effects: “It seems over-optimistic to 
imagine that a world-wide framework for competition policy could be built up piecemeal from a net-
work of bilateral agreements. (…) [I]t would be virtually impossible to ensure that all the agreements 
were compatible with each other” (Meiklejohn 1999: 1247).  
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approach is closely related to the network ideas but provides a more systematic 
and more concrete perspective with its focus on competence allocation and de-
limitation rules – an issue that is usually neglected. 
 
Obviously, the proposal presented here cannot bring forward a perfect interna-
tional competition policy. Next to the problems of acceptance and consensus on 
implementing such a multilevel regime, three other phenomena might compli-
cate its working.
32 Firstly, the really big and controversial cases, like the infa-
mous Microsoft case for instance, will occur somewhat infrequent or might 
even be unique. Since many elements of the proposed international multilevel 
competition policy system depend on repeated (inter-) action, for instance the 
sanction mechanism, they might not work smoothly in the face of such a dis-
continuity. An appointed lead jurisdiction for a case like Microsoft would have 
to weigh the incentive to reap benefits from a biased decision (looking at do-
mestic welfare alone and dismissing justified interests of other impacted juris-
dictions) against the countervailing incentives from the consequent loss of repu-
tation and further appointments as a lead jurisdiction. Perhaps the gains of a bi-
ased decision of Microsoft would have been big enough for the U.S. antitrust 
authorities (or the EU ones) to abuse an eventual appointment as the lead juris-
diction in this case. This must remain speculative. If it was that way, however, 
then both the current system of uncoordinated extraterritorial competition poli-
cies and even more so a world authority with substantive competences might be 
superiour for this single case (but not necessarily for the overall welfare record).  
 
Secondly, cases might involve novel issues so that it is hard to distinguish dis-
criminatory from non-discriminatory policies. However, this is a problem that 
all types of regimes struggle with. A powerful world authority with substantive 
competences can make mistakes and deice such a case in a discriminatory way 
and the absence of a any kind of lead jurisdiction will not alleviate the knowl-
edge problem, either. In contrast to more centralised systems, however, the 
                                                            
32   I owe the inspiration for the following discussion to two anonymous referees.  
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multilevel character of the proposed regime allows for a more rapid influx of 
new knowledge, generating an advantage of decentralised systems to deal with 
novelties in the longer run if not in regard to the first case. 
 
Thirdly, if the lead jurisdiction is appointed after a conduct or agreement has 
taken place, then what about the predictability of regulatory decisions (legal 
certainty)? Obviously, legal certainty would be higher in a more centralised re-
gime, ideally with one world competition authority responsible for all cases. On 
the other hand, the proposal presented here improves the predictability of com-
petition policy outcomes compared to the current ‘system’. Currently, norm ad-
dressees face reviews and procedures by multiple national competition policy 
regimes. This makes it (i) difficult to anticipate all the different outcomes and 
(ii) almost impossible to predict the effects from the interaction of the kaleido-
scope of mutually incoherent outcomes. With the proposed multilevel system, 
the predictability of the competition policy decision largely depends on the pre-
dictability of the lead jurisdiction selection process. After a while, norm ad-
dressees will most likely develop competences in anticipating what lead juris-
diction will be appointed for their case – or at least, which 1-2 competition pol-
icy regimes can be seen as serious contenders. As the selection and appointment 
process is not random but follows predictable patterns, legal certainty should be 
quite high and probably not much deviating from the minimum standard pro-
posals at the beginning of this section. Note that these considerations include 
leniency programs for cartel defectors. They might not be able to perfectly pre-
dict the competent jurisdiction but, after a transitory period, anticipation capa-
bilities will be considerable. This represents an improvement in terms of legal 
certainty in comparison to the current situation of uncoordinated multijurisdic-
tional enforcement where a cartel breaker might get leniency in one jurisdiction, 
the evidence made available during that public (court) procedure, however, 
might enable another jurisdiction to penalize him for the very same deed.  
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5.  Conclusion 
This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition pol-
icy system, which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of 
institutions. In doing so, it targets to contribute to bridge a gap in the current 
world economic order, i.e. an effective supranational governance of private in-
ternational restrictions to market competition. The proposal builds upon a com-
bination of the well-known nondiscrimination principle and the concept of a 
lead jurisdiction model. In order to maintain decentralised elements, competi-
tion policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of 
appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the 
substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing national 
and regional antitrust regimes. The competition policy agency at the global 
level – tentatively labelled ICP – appoints (on a case-by-case basis) a lead ju-
risdiction from downward levels, which deals with a concrete antitrust case. 
Furthermore, it supervises the acting lead jurisdiction and ensures the non-
discriminatory character of its provisions, institutions, practices, and decisions. 
Apart from the nondiscrimination issue, downward jurisdictions are free to 
shape their competition policy regimes individually. However, for which cases 
they are competent or can claim to be competent is governed in a clearcut way, 
thus minimising both loopholes and conflicts in the protection of international 
competition. Such an international multilevel system of competition policies 
could combine the benefits of decentralised and centralised elements and 
somewhat represent the minimum of necessary competences on a global level 
in order to ensure an effective protection of international competition.  
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